paper. By selling these Y2K options, the central bank committed a large amount of liquidity to the Treasury bond markets. Our goal here is to use this unique event to gain insights into the relationship between the actions of the central bank and the liquidity premium in the Treasury bond markets.
Through the event of Y2K and Y2K options, we show the link between the liquidity premium of government debt and the central bank's provision of liquidity. Using the implied volatilities of Y2K options and the spread between the off-the-run and on-the-run Treasury bonds, we demonstrate that the Fed's action eased the fears of Treasury bond dealers. The ease of fear contributed to a drop in the liquidity premium of Treasury securities. We argue that the issuance of Y2K options and their effects on liquidity premium is in broad conformity with the economic theory on public provision of private liquidity.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1, we discuss the nature of the Y2K problem and describe the Fed's issuance of Y2K options to deal with the problem. In Section 2, we analyze the implied volatilities of Y2K options and the aggressiveness of demand for the central bank's provision of liquidity. This analysis allows us to get an assessment of the market's view of potential shock in the period before the Y2K date and to document how the view changed from October through December 1999. In Section 3, we link Y2K options to the liquidity premium in the Treasury markets. Finally, in Section 4, we interpret the Fed's use of Y2K options in the context of received economic theory on public provision of private liquidity. We also discuss other actions taken by the Fed, as well as actions taken by other central banks. In Section 5, we provide concluding remarks.
Background

Potential liquidity shortage around Y2K
On the Y2K date, financial institutions faced the technological risk that their own systems would fail and cause operational problems. Toward the end of the twentieth century, these institutions began to rely heavily, if not exclusively, on computers to transact business, keep records, and maintain security. Nearly every financial transaction involves numerous computer functions. The Y2K problem originated from a belief that most computer software, using only the last two digits to identify the year, could misinterpret a transaction date in 2000 as one in 1900. With such misinterpretation, interest could be miscalculated, stock trades could vanish, and customers could have difficulty accessing their accounts or using their credit and debit cards. This high level of technological dependence made financial institutions particularly vulnerable to the Y2K problem.
Beyond this technological vulnerability and perhaps more importantly, financial institutions also faced the risk that their counterparties would fail on the Y2K date. Financial institutions are known for their interconnectedness The reluctance to make loans that would mature on or immediately after Y2K pushed up the commercial paper rate. From June to November 1999, the spread between one-month commercial paper and Treasury bill rates fluctuated between 20 and 74 basis points for nonfinancial and financial companies, as noted in Panels A and B of Figure 2 . However, beginning on December 1, 1999, the spread for nonfinancial companies increased dramatically and reached a peak level of 116 basis points on December 27. This is an increase of 84 basis points from a spread of 32 basis points on November 30. The spread for financial companies also increased dramatically in the last month of 1999. It rose from 31 basis points on November 30 to 114 basis points on December 23. Clearly, short-term borrowing costs were higher than usual for loans that were to mature immediately after Y2K.
The rise in borrowing cost was also evidenced in Eurodollar time deposits (see Panel C of Figure 2 ), similar to the spreads of commercial paper over the Treasury bills. The spread between the rates on one-month Eurodollar time deposits and Treasury bills fluctuated between 20 and 77 basis points during the period of June-November 1999. The spread then began to widen quickly on December 1 and reached a peak of 131 basis points by December 8, 1999 . The spreads remained at a high level until December 28, 1999, and then declined significantly thereafter. Clearly, due to counterparty risk, the cost of obtaining liquidity from money markets in the private sector became prohibitively expensive during the period immediately before Y2K.
Counterparty risk was a major concern for the US central bank. Peter Fisher, then Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, described this concern clearly: "It seemed quite reasonable for customers and bankers to agree to shift settlements of forward transactions away from the first few days of January. However, we became more troubled by the escalating efforts, of a number of market participants, to discourage normal trading, issuance, and investment activities during the Y2K transition. The destruction of market liquidity implied by these efforts presented the risk of a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby extreme risk aversion would create expectations-and the reality-of exceptionally thin market conditions, making it more likely that markets could be jarred by even a modest external shock-Y2K related or otherwise." 2 In August 1999, the US central bank concluded that Y2K might lead to a liquidity shortage if no actions were taken to prevent it. The central bank was aware of the possibility that customers and bankers might agree to shift settlements of forward transactions away from the Y2K period. It concluded that the market might need potentially large year-end reserves. If dealers and financial intermediaries were to withdraw from important markets, such as repurchase agreements during this critical period, it would be challenging for the Fed to meet the need for liquidity in a highly illiquid financing market at year-end.
Options issued by the US central bank
The US central bank responded with several policy initiatives to meet the potential aggregate liquidity shortage, but the most important and innovative initiatives were the issuance of options. The US central bank sold state-contingent contracts, contracts with terms explicitly specified to be contingent on the liquidity state around Y2K. It was possible because Y2K represented one of the few foreseeable states of potential aggregate liquidity shortage.
3 These contracts were options that allowed institutional buyers to exercise and obtain liquidity in the presence of an aggregate liquidity shock around Y2K. They were clearly targeted to meet the potential shortage of liquidity for banks and players in the Treasury bond market. The institutional arrangement of Y2K options and the intent of the Fed in issuing the options are described in detail by Drossos and Hilton (2000) . The rest of this subsection offers a brief overview of the options.
The first initiative of issuing options contracts was the Special Liquidity Facility (SLF). The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) approved the initiative on July 20, 1999, more than five months ahead of Y2K. Under SLF, at Columbia University Libraries on August 3, 2010 http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org
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the depository institutions were given the option to borrow from the Federal Reserve discount window at an interest rate that was fixed to a level above the prevailing federal funds target rate during a period that covered the century date change. In SLF, depository institutions were given call options for credit on July 20, 1999. The strike of the option was set at 150 basis points above the prevailing federal funds target rate, and it could be exercised during the period from October 1, 1999, to April 7, 2000. These options were granted free of cost.
The second initiative was the Standby Financing Facility (SFF), in which the Fed conducted a series of auctions to sell options contracts. These options gave the holders the right, but not the obligation, to execute overnight repo transactions with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at a preset strike price, which was a financing rate that was 150 basis points above the prevailing federal funds target rate. The unit of the option contract was $50 million. These options could be exercised during some specified periods around Y2K. Under SFF, demanders of future liquidity were invited to bid for the options at periodic intervals before Y2K. The Fed's purpose in issuing these options was to insure that the bond markets operated smoothly around Y2K so that the Fed could conduct its monetary policy operations without running into difficulties. In its August 24, 1999, meeting, the FOMC made the necessary rulings to permit the auction of these options. 4 In SFF, options were sold in uniform-price auctions, which is the current form of auctions for the issuance of all Treasury debt securities. The supply in each auction is the total amount accepted in the auction. This amount is announced before each auction. However, the result of an auction probably affected the amount the Fed planned to accept in the next auction. The Fed increased the quantities in the second and the third auctions because the demand in the first round surpassed the Fed's expectations. The price determined by the supply and demand in an auction is referred to as the stop-out rate.
5 The stop-out rate contains useful information about the liquidity demand since the bidders bid after the supply is announced by the central bank. For a fixed supply, the higher the stop-out rate the bidder is willing to pay for buying the option on liquidity, the greater the demand for the public provision of private liquidity.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York conducted seven auctions in SFF, selling three types of options with varying maturity dates in each auction. The auctions were on the following seven dates in 1999: October 20, October 27, November 3, November 10, November 17, November 23, and December 1. The first type of options allowed the holder to exercise during the period from December 30, 1999, to January 5, 2000, which covered the Millennium Date Change. This option is referred to as "the December 30 strip" by the Fed. The second allowed the holder to exercise during the period from December 23, The quantity of bids and the accepted amounts are reported in billions of dollars. The stop-out rates are quoted in basis points. The ratio of accepted to total is the total amount of bids divided by the accepted amounts.
1999, to December 29, 1999. The third allowed the holder to exercise during the period from January 6, 2000, to January 12, 2000. The last two options are referred to as "the December 23 strip" and "the January 6 strip," respectively. Through the option contracts in SFF and SLF, the central bank assured the availability of a large amount of liquidity around Y2K. Using SFF, the Fed sold a large quantity of liquidity insurance to Treasury bond dealers. Table 1 presents a summary of the options issued in SFF. The total repo contracts sold in the options of the December 30 strip were worth $223 billion. The total repo contracts sold in the options of December 23 and January 6 strips were worth $114 billion and $144 billion, respectively. To get a perspective on the significance of these options, we note that the average outstanding repo in 1999 was $1361 billion; this implies that the December 30 strip was about 16% of the average daily outstanding repo. In addition, the Fed committed itself, through SLF, to providing depository institutions with an alternative source of liquidity for handling potentially large withdrawals (demand for liquidity) of deposits or currencies. This commitment shaped the expectations about the availability of year-end liquidity.
6
The options issued in SFF are distinct from those in SLF in several ways. First, the holders of options operated in different markets; the option holders in SLF were depository institutions while the option holders in SFF were bond dealers. One reason for SFF is that the Fed did not think the benefits of SLF would be sufficiently transmitted to the bond dealer market. Second, options in at Columbia University Libraries on August 3, 2010 http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org SLF were issued free of cost while options in SFF were sold for a price. The price-and-demand curves of the options in SFF allow us to examine the market view of the liquidity shortage prior to Y2K, while such an examination is not possible with the free options in SLF. In the rest of this paper, we refer to the options in SFF as Y2K options.
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Price-and-Demand Functions of Y2K Options
Repo as the underlying
In order to understand the payoff and value of Y2K options, we first examine the behavior of the general collateral repo rate. The repo rate is the underlying rate of Y2K options because dealers must collateralize their overnight borrowing from the Fed. In Panel A of date of our data, 7 and the last date is the day before the first auction of Y2K options. Since the strike prices of Y2K options are quoted as the spread over the prevailing Fed funds target rate, in Panel A of Table 2 , we also provide the statistics for the spread between the repo rate and the target rate during the same period.
The repo rate tends to spike at quarter-ends (including year-ends). In Figure 3 , we plot the repo rates over the 1991-99 period. Along with the repo rates, we plot the Fed funds target rates after adding 150 basis points. As one might expect, on most days the repo rate is very close to (in fact, slightly below) the Fed funds target rate. Nevertheless, the repo rate often spikes, and the spikes tend to occur one or two days before the quarter-ends and year-ends. Understanding these spikes is essential for the valuation of Y2K options because the maturity of the December 30 strip of Y2K options spanned over a year-end but the maturity dates of the other two strips did not.
The literature has documented that short-term interest rates tend to rise near quarter-ends or year-ends. For example, using one-month LIBOR and related derivatives, Griffiths and Winters (2005) and Neely and Winters (2005) have shown that short-term interest rates tend to rise at year-ends. Such a rise is attributed to increases in risk or preference for cash around quarter-ends or year-ends. Musto (1997) notes that commercial paper tends to sell at a discount if it matures in the next calendar year, and attributes the discount to agency problems. It is well known that financial institutions typically clean up liabilities in their accounts for quarter-end or year-end reporting. This is referred to as window dressing, which reduces liquidity in money markets. Due to window dressing, the volatility of repo rates within a quarter should be different from the volatility around a quarter-end (and year-end).
We can estimate and test the difference between the repo rate's behavior around a quarter-end and its behavior within a quarter. We examine the subsample of the repo-target spreads that are on quarter-end dates and two business days around. For convenience, we refer to this subsample as the "quarter-end" sample. All the spreads that are more than two days away from quarter-end dates constitute another sample, which is referred to as the "within-quarter" sample. To test for the difference between the two subsamples, we use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the following specification:
where r t is the repo-target spread, and I t is the dummy variable that equals 1 when t is in the quarter-end sample and 0 otherwise. We chose model (1) because it is a standard and convenient approach to estimation and test of multiplicative heteroskedasticity, which is exactly the problem we have here. The model preserves the restriction that variance is positive but allows for simple maximum likelihood estimation and tests for heteroskedasticity, which is a problem for a simple linear regression. The properties and advantages of this model are discussed extensively by Harvey (1976) . The model is also discussed in introductory textbooks like Greene (1997) and Judge, Hill, Griffiths, and Lee (1985) . c in model (1) is consistent with the empirical evidence of window dressing reported in the literature. Since repo contracts are collateralized loans and Fed funds are not collateralized, repo rates should normally be lower than Fed funds rates but not around quarter-ends. In the within-quarter sample, the repo rates are on average lower than the target rates by 1.61 basis points (bps) and statistically significant (Panel C of Table 2 ). This number is consistent with the intuition that collateral should reduce the interest rate on a loan. However, this intuition does not hold for the quarter-end sample. Interestingly, this intuition does not hold in the complete sample either (Panel A of Table 2 ); the mean of the spread between repo and target rates is far smaller than one basis point (only 0.25 bps), and the t-statistic is insignificant (only 0.65) for test of zero mean.
The jump in the repo-target spread around Y2K is not materially different from other jumps around quarter-or year-ends. In Figure 4 , we plot the spread between the repo rate and Fed funds target rate over the last three months of 1999 and the first month of 2000. The spread has a typical spike as those on other quarter-ends or year-ends. A special feature is the big drop of the repo rate before New Year's Day. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York used morning repo rates to chart the behavior of repo rates on the days around Y2K; 9 we reprint the chart in Figure 5 for ready reference. The repo rates in the figure fell significantly in the last few days before Y2K. The Fed's annual report suggests that the drop is due to the Fed's provision of liquidity right before Y2K. Notice 
Premium of Y2K options
An important question is whether the observed prices of Y2K options contained any premium, which is attributable to a potential jump in repo rates at the end of 1999. It is clear that the price of the December 23 strip should have contained little year-end or Y2K premium because it matured well before the end of 1999. If there was a year-end premium and/or a Y2K premium, it is most likely to be reflected in the price of the December 30 strip, as it could be exercised in the week that covered Y2K. The January 6 strip might also contain some Y2K premium if the market expected the Y2K problem to last beyond the first few days of 2000. As shown in Table 1 , the stop-out rate of the December 30 strip is much higher than the stop-out rates of these other two strips.
The high stop-out rate of the December 30 strip alone is not sufficient for us to conclude that a Y2K premium existed in the price of Y2K options. First, these options had different maturities. Second, the options were auctioned on different dates and consequently have different levels of underlying repo rates on those dates. Third, and most importantly, given the fact that repo rates usually have higher volatility around a quarter-end (or a year-end) than during a quarter, the December 30 strip of Y2K options was expected to be more expensive than the other two strips, even if there was no concern about the Y2K problem at the end of 1999. We wish to know whether there was an incremental premium due to the effect of Y2K. Unfortunately, there are no repo options around other year-ends for us to compare with Y2K options.
The value of Y2K options should, however, be very low if the market did not believe that an unusual jump on Y2K is likely. Based on the historical behavior of the repo rate up to the last quarter of 1999, Y2K options should not have been expected to be in the money if Y2K were not expected to affect the overnight borrowing rate. Since the payoff of a Y2K option is a linear function of the repo-target spread if the option is in the money (i.e., if the repo rate is above the Fed funds target rate by more than 150 bps) and the payoff is zero otherwise, the value of a Y2K option depends on the likelihood that the repo-target spread is above 150 bps. The statistics in Table 2 show that the maximum repo-target spread in our sample is 145 bps and its date is December 30, 1996, which is a year-end. Therefore, if repo rates are not expected to jump over the historical maximum level of 145 bps, it is very unlikely for the Y2K options to be in the money. As a matter of fact, the Y2K options were never exercised by the buyers. Apparently, the Fed set the strike price high enough that these options were used as insurance for Y2K shocks but not for the typical year-end jumps of short-term rates.
To compare the prices of Y2K options, we need a valuation framework. In order to use the standard options pricing framework, we need to make the following additional assumptions. First, we assume that the market had perfect foresight about the actions taken by the FOMC. This allows us to abstract from the fact that the strike prices were stochastic. In addition, we need to abstract from the fact that no secondary market existed for these options. Under these assumptions, Y2K options are caplets on the repo rate. We use Black's model of interest rate caps to calculate their implied volatilities so that we can compare values of options on the same underlying but with different times to maturity and different strike prices. Strike rate K is 150 basis points above the target rate. The size of the loan, denoted by L, in one Y2K option contract can be viewed as $50 million because it is the increment of the bids. The expiration time of the option is the expiration period of a strip, which is of Bermudan-type and contains a few days. In order to use Black's formula, we treat Y2K options as European options that mature only on a particular day in the expiration period and denote the date by T. 10 The timing of the caplet's payoff is a day after the exercise of a Y2K option and is denoted by T'.
It is important to point out that Y2K options differ from the exchangetraded options in several respects. First, the strike price was linked to the target Fed funds rate at the time the options were exercised. This implies that the strike price was potentially stochastic to the extent that there was significant uncertainty about the actions of the FOMC. Second, the target Fed funds rate is not a market-determined interest rate or the yield on a traded asset. This implies that the conventional approach to valuing options (using the equivalent martingale measure) is not valid for determining the value of these options. Third, these options did not have a secondary market and as such are more like executive stock options. The valuation of such options requires the explicit modeling of preferences of investors. For these reasons, an application of standard options pricing models should be viewed as an approximation.
With the parameters specified earlier, Black's formula (see Chapter 20 of Hull, 2000) for the value of a caplet is
where N(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Besides those parameters specified in a caplet contract, the formula needs three variables, which are determined by the capital markets. The first is r, which is the yield to maturity for a zero-coupon bond that matures at T' and can be obtained from the term structure of LIBOR contracts. The second is F, which is the forward repo rate for the period from T to T' and can be obtained from the curve of term repo rates. The third is c, which is the price of the option and can be calculated from the stop-out rate (please refer to Footnote 5 for the transformation from stop-out rates to dollar values). Now, the only unobservable parameter in the formula is the volatility σ of the underlying. Solving for σ from Equations (2), (3), and (4) gives the implied volatility of Y2K options, which are reported in Table 3 . A graphical presentation of the implied volatilities is shown in Figure 6 . The implied volatilities suggest that the dealers felt that large jumps in repo rates might happen during a narrow period surrounding January 1, 2000. Judged by implied volatility, the December 30 strip is considerably more expensive than the December 23 strip. The ratios presented in Table 3 strip contains at least a premium on the year-end jump of borrowing rate. Given the fact that the strike price of Y2K options was set so high that the options would not be in the money with the maximum historical repo-target spread, we suspect that at least part of the option's premium reflected concerns about the Y2K shocks beyond the usual year-end jumps. Interestingly, the implied volatility of the January 6 strip is about the same as (and even slightly smaller than) the implied volatility of the December 23 strip, indicating that nothing unusual in the week after Century Date Change was expected. In order to see whether a premium due to a jump beyond the usual year-end effect exists in the December 30 strip of Y2K options, we compare the implied volatilities with the standard deviation of the repo-target spread. The Y2K options in the December 23 strip should be a function of the volatility during a quarter, while the options in the December 30 strip should be a function of the volatility at quarter-end. For the repo-target spread, the ratio of the standard deviation of the quarter-end sample to the standard deviation of within-quarter sample is 2.03 (Panel C of Table 2 ). If Y2K is not an incremental shock to the usual year-end effect, then the ratio of the implied volatilities for the two strips should be comparable with the ratio of the standard deviations in the two subsamples of repo-target spreads. In contrast, the ratio of the implied volatility of the December 30 strip to the implied volatility of the December 23 strip is about 2.50 in three auctions and above 2.03 in all except the last two auctions (Table 3 ). We view this as an indication of the Y2K premium in the December 30 strip. In the last auction, the ratio of implied volatilities of the two strips is only 1.70. If we take the stand that 2.03 is a normal level for the ratio of quarter-end volatility to within-quarter volatility, the low ratio in the last auction indicates that the market expected a shock even smaller than the usual year-end.
The implied volatilities indicate that dealers' expectation of a year-end jump changed over the seven auctions. For the purpose of our analysis in later sections, the relevant issue is not whether there is a Y2K premium in addition to the usual year-end premium. Rather, the key issue is whether the Fed's actions influenced the funding costs of dealers. In this context, the variation, rather than the level, of the implied volatilities over the auctions is important; the variation points to the effect of the central bank's commitment of funds and the change of views by market players. In Table 3 , and more visibly in Figure 6 , the implied volatility of the December 23 strip remains almost constant. This indicates that the dealer's view of the within-quarter repo rates was not changing or influenced by the issuance of Y2K options. The implied volatility of the December 30 strip, however, varied over the auctions. Then, the ratio of the implied volatility of the December 30 strip to the implied volatility of the December 23 strip varied accordingly. In contrast, the implied volatility of the January 6 strip did not vary as much over the auctions.
It is necessary to understand whether the change in the implied volatilities of Y2K options is caused by the change in the expectation of the repo rate volatility shortly after the century date change. This would have been difficult to address, if the Y2K options issued by the Fed had consisted of only one strip with a fixed maturity period. Fortunately, the Y2K options auctioned to the dealers include a strip of maturity before the century date change and a strip of maturity after the century date change. If the change in the implied volatilities of Y2K options is caused by the change in the expectation of the repo rate volatility shortly after the century date change, the implied volatilities of the December 23 strip should be different from the implied volatilities of the January 6 strip. However, Figure 6 shows that the implied volatilities are the same for the two strips. In contrast, the implied volatilities of the December 30 strip are much higher than the implied volatilities of the other strips. This means that a large part of the increase in the implied volatility of a December 30 strip is the premium on the volatility in the dates of the century date change. Furthermore, after three auctions, the implied volatilities of the December 30 strip dropped significantly, while the implied volatilities of the other strips did not. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the general level of the repo rate uncertainty was expected to be higher.
Aggressiveness of demand
Since the evidence reported in the previous section based on Black's model is only an approximation, in this section we provide additional evidence that is based directly on the aggressiveness of the bids in the auctions. The evidence in this section does not rely on the assumptions that we made for the application of Black's model. The variation of the demand for Y2K options over the seven auctions should reflect the effects of the Fed's action on market conditions. With the Fed's intention to ensure that dealers have enough protection against shocks so that they do not withdraw from the market, the Fed adjusted the future accepted amount after each auction to satisfy the total demand for liquidity protection. In each auction, the accepted amount (supply) should directly affect the implied volatility of Y2K options in the auction. It might also indirectly affect the implied volatility in the later auctions if it affected the demand functions in later auctions. According to its 1999 report of open market operations, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York believes that the demand was satisfied, citing the drop of the price and demand in the last auction.
With the data obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, we can estimate the demand functions in each auction. We use the standard demand function with constant elasticity. The functional form is
where Q is the quantity of the Y2K options quoted in billions of dollars of repurchase agreements and P is the price of the Y2K options quoted in basis points. We estimate the parameters a and b from the regression
where Q i is the total quantity of bid at prices lower than or equal to price P i . The parameter a is the intercept of the loglinear regression of the demand function. The parameter b is the demand elasticity, which measures the sensitivity of quantity to price changes. The assumption of constant elasticity is motivated not only by simplicity but also by the fact that we have a problem with small A demand function is estimated by a regression of log quantity on log stop-out rate. The elasticity of demand is the slope coefficient in the regression. The aggressiveness of demand is the value of e to the power of the intercept. The aggressiveness ratio is the aggressiveness for a strip divided by the aggressiveness for another strip.
rate. We present the demand and supply only for the December 30 strip because this strip contains the premium for year-end and Y2K, as we have demonstrated previously. We want to know how aggressively dealers bid in each auction. For this purpose, we can compare the quantity demanded in one auction at a price with the quantity demanded in another auction at the same price. Let a and a' be the intercepts in the loglinear regressions of two demand functions. If the two demand functions have the same elasticity, then the ratio of the two quantities demanded at any price level is e a−a '. In this sense, e a measures the aggressiveness of the demand because the quantity demanded for any given price is an increasing function of a. If two demand functions have different elasticity, e a−a ' is the ratio of the quantities demanded at price P = 1. Therefore, e a is the quantity demanded at unit price. We thus refer to e a as the aggressiveness of the demand. In Table 4 , we provide the demand aggressiveness and elasticity for each auction of each strip of Y2K options.
The aggressiveness of demand shows that dealers were concerned about a potential shock on the Y2K date, but not before or after it. This can be seen clearly in Figure 8 . On each auction date, the demand for the December 30 strip is always more aggressive than the demand for the other two strips. It suggests that the year-end or Y2K concerns brought about strong demand for the December 30 strip. In contrast, the aggressiveness of the demand for the January 6 strip is only slightly higher than the December 23 strip. Dealers did not seem to worry about prolonged problems after Y2K. To look at the relative at Columbia University Libraries on August 3, 2010 http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org
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Figure 8 Aggressiveness of demand for Y2K options
A demand function is estimated by a regression of log quantity on log stop-out rate. The aggressiveness of a demand is the value of e to the power of the intercept of the regression. The aggressiveness of demand for each strip of Y2K options is plotted over the seven auction dates.
aggressiveness, we report, in Table 4 , the ratio of the aggressiveness for the December 30 strip to the aggressiveness for the December 23 strip. This ratio varies drastically over the seven auctions and has a downward trend.
Indeed, dealers bid aggressively for the insurance of Y2K shock in early auctions but much less so in later auctions. The aggressiveness of the demand for the December 30 strip was high on October 27 and November 3. It started to diminish in the auction on November 10. The demand curves for the last three auction dates, plotted in Figure 7 , clearly show a significant drop. In the last auction, the aggressiveness of the demand for the December 30 strip was about the same as the demand for the other strips. The variation of the aggressiveness for the December 23 or the January 6 strip was much smaller than the variation for the December 30 strip. Therefore, the Fed's action exerted a large influence on the demand for the December 30 strip but a small influence on the demand for the December 23 and January 6 strips.
It is important to point out that the aggressiveness measures the bidding behavior at a single auction independently. It does not treat the bidding behavior as part of a broader bidding strategy that takes into account the knowledge that there are future auctions. Unfortunately, due to confidentiality issues, the auction data provided by the Fed do not allow us to track individual bidders for strategic bidding behavior. To complicate matters, the Fed was also learning from each auction and dynamically altering the supply.
Is the drop of price and demand of Y2K option related to the drop in liquidity premium? The Federal Reserve Bank of New York believes that the price of Y2K options contains a liquidity premium and the demand of Y2K options is the demand of liquidity. This belief is expressed explicitly by Drossos and Hilton (2000) in their Fed publication. The belief that the Y2K options ease the fear of bond dealers is also reflected in the 1999 annual report of the Fed's open market operations. However, the link between the price/demand of Y2K options and the liquidity premium in the markets has not been established with formal economic analysis. In the next section, we empirically demonstrate that the variation in the price/demand of Y2K options is related to the liquidity premium in the Treasury market. Then, in Section 4, we show that the issuance of Y2K options and their effects broadly conform to the economic theory and practice on public provision of private liquidity.
Liquidity Premium in Treasury Markets
On/off-the-run spread as liquidity premium
The liquidity premium in government securities has received extensive attention from an empirical perspective. The papers by Kamara (1994) ; Duffie (1996) ; Jordan and Jordan (1997) ; Krishnamurthy (2002) ; Longstaff (2001) ; and Buraschi and Menini (2002) represent some of the earlier contributions.
In empirical studies, the proxy for the liquidity premium in government debt is usually the spread between the yield to maturity of a newly auctioned government security and that of a government security auctioned earlier. The newly auctioned government security is referred to as an on-the-run or new bond, while the one auctioned earlier is referred to as an off-the-run or old bond. With rare exceptions, an on-the-run bond trades at a yield lower than the yield of similar off-the-run bond. The level of the spread depends, inter alia, on the expected auction date and the actual occurrence of the next auction. When the next auction occurs, the current on-the-run bond becomes the next off-the-run bond with lower liquidity, and the current off-the-run bond becomes an even older issue, which has even lower liquidity. 12 The magnitude of the spread between on-the-run and off-the-run debt issues and their relationship to auction dates are reported in Sundaresan (1994) .
The on/off-the-run spread has been related to their specialness in the repo markets, which is another proxy for the liquidity premium of government securities.
13 Duffie (1996) constructs a model where a bond attracts a higher price if it trades special in the repo markets. He observes that Treasury bonds have different values in the market for collateral-the new bond is generally more attractive as collateral than the old bond. Hence, a new bond commands a higher price (or lower yield) relative to the old bond. The collateral value obviously goes up in periods of liquidity shortage, thereby resulting in a higher spread between on-the-run and off-the-run bonds.
There is much empirical research demonstrating that the on/off-the-run spread serves as a reasonable proxy for the liquidity premium. For example, Jordan and Jordan (1997) provide evidence supporting this view. Buraschi and Menini (2002) examine the term repo spread, which is regarded as an indicator of the duration of expected specialness in the repo markets. They show that the violation in the expectations hypothesis may be due to the presence of time-varying liquidity premium in government debt securities. Krishnamurthy (2002) gives a liquidity underpinning in his explanation of the level and variations in on/off-the-run spread. He explores the relationship between the on/off-the-run spread and the spread between commercial paper and Treasury bills. Longstaff (2001) demonstrates that the short-term spread is primarily driven by liquidity-related factors.
Because on/off-the-run spread is extensively studied in the literature and is available on a high-frequency basis, we will closely examine this measure of liquidity premium in the period around Y2K. An alternative candidate for the measure of the liquidity premium is the difference between general collateral repo rates and special repo rates. Given Duffie's (1996) theoretical arguments and Krishnamurthy's (2002) empirical work, we suspect that the spread between the general collateral rate and the special repo rate as a measure of liquidity premium will generate results that are qualitatively similar to those we present in this paper. Unfortunately, we do not have access to historical data on the special repo rates.
The on/off-the-run spread examined in our analysis is the average of the spreads on five-year and 10-year Treasury notes.
14 The 10-year notes are liquid securities in Treasury markets. Although the 30-year bond was a major benchmark used in many previous studies, the new issues of 30-year bonds ceased to be liquid in 1999 when the Treasury started to reduce the quantity of new issues of 30-year bonds and planned to initiate a buyback program in response to the projected surplus over the next several years.
15 If the data were to include 30-year bonds, it would be hard to tell whether the rise of the liquidity premium is caused by the shrinking supply of 30-year bonds or by Y2K concerns.
Incorporation of five-year notes in the data offers an inclusive measure of the on/off-the-run spread on medium-term notes. Due to the suspension of 20-year bonds, on/off-the-run spread of 10-year notes is suspected to behave differently than the spread of other Treasury securities (Fleming, 2003) . The inclusion of five-year notes should alleviate this concern. (To alleviate the concern even further, we also report results separately for on/off-the-run spread of five-year notes.) Note that five-year notes have the same quarterly auction cycle as 10-year notes in 1999. Because they have the same auction cycle, we can examine the average on/off-the-run spread of five-year and 10-year notes. Averaging the spreads reduces the noise driven by the microstructure of the Treasury bond markets.
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To look at the behavior of on/off-the-run spread around Y2K, in Figure 9 we plot the spread during January 1, 1999-January 31, 2000. The figure shows the auction dates as vertical lines. Disregarding the fluctuations related to the auction cycle, the spreads have an upward trend and peaked during the first half of 1999, but then dropped substantially during the second half. More importantly, the spread did not rise sharply toward the end of 1999. To understand what happened to the on/off-the-run spread before Y2K, we link the behavior to the provision of liquidity by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the last quarter of 1999.
Testing the effects of Y2K options
Since the on/off-the-run spread is affected by several factors in the markets, we need to control for those factors by using a model for the behavior of the spread when testing for the effects of Y2K options. We use Krishnamurthy's (2002) , between one-month commercial paper and three-month Treasury bills. 17 The liquidity premium in the Treasury market is also closely related to the supply (denoted by X SUP t ) of the on-the-run five-year and 10-year Treasury notes.
The basic model for our analysis assumes that the on/off-the-run spread is a function of the auction cycle, commercial paper rate, and the supply of new bonds. The regression equation of the model is bond markets. The change of the Y2K premium in the options over the seven auctions offers insight into the change in the liquidity premium related to the liquidity shortage around Y2K. The implied volatilities of Y2K options show how unusual the market expected the liquidity shortage to be around Y2K. We therefore hypothesize that if the implied volatility of the December 30 strip drops relative to the December 23 strip, the liquidity premium in the Treasury bond markets should also drop, ceteris paribus.
We introduce a variable X RIV to capture the changes of the year-end and Y2K premium in the price of Y2K options. On date t, let X RIV t be the ratio of the implied volatility of the December 30 strip to the implied volatility of the December 23 strip if t is one of the seven auction dates for Y2K options. For a date t between two auctions of Y2K options, X RIV t is the linear interpolation of the volatility ratios in the two auctions. If date t is before all auctions of Y2K options, X RIV t equals the volatility ratio in the first auction. After all auctions of Y2K options, the variable X RIV t is set to the volatility ratio in the last auction. Obviously, the variable X RIV t is stepwise linear in time. Although this does not fully capture the day-to-day variation in the Y2K premium (or year-end premium), it provides an approximation of the changes. The approximation is admittedly imprecise but it can still be informative, especially if it is significantly correlated with the on/off-the-run spread after controlling for other factors.
We extend the basic model to include the variable X RIV and refer to the extended model as RIV model. The model is expressed as
If on/off-the-run spread is affected by Y2K and the issuance of Y2K options, the coefficient β RIV should be positive because a high Y2K premium in the prices of Y2K options should be associated with a high-liquidity premium in the Treasury bond markets.
The effects of Y2K options on the on/off-the-run spread can also be assessed by using the aggressiveness of demand to assess. Given the close link between repo markets and Treasury bond markets, high demand for protection of shocks in the repo rate should be associated with high-liquidity premium in the Treasury bond markets. As we have discussed in Section 2.3, if the Fed successfully satisfied the demand for protections against liquidity shocks, the issuance of Y2K options should have affected the demand of Y2K options in the next auction besides pushing down the price of Y2K options in a current auction. If the Fed's injection of liquidity improved the market conditions and reduced the borrowing cost for dealers, the reduction of demand for Y2K options should have been associated with a decrease in the liquidity premium in Treasury bond markets. If this is true, the on/off-the-run spread should have dropped when the aggressiveness of the demand for the December 30 strip of Y2K options dropped relative to the December 23 strip.
To capture the changes of the demand for Y2K options, we introduce a variable X AGR . On date t, let X AGR t be the ratio of the aggressiveness for the December 30 strip to the aggressiveness for the December 23 strip if t is one of the seven auction dates for Y2K options. For a date t between two auctions of Y2K options, X AGR t is the linear interpolation of the aggressiveness ratios in the two auctions. If date t is before all auctions of Y2K options, X AGR t equals the aggressiveness ratio in the first auction. After all auctions of Y2K options, the variable X AGR t is set to the aggressiveness ratio in the last auction. Like X RIV t , the variable X AGR t is stepwise linear in time and thus does not fully capture the day-to-day variation in the year-end and Y2K premium, but it provides a useful approximation of the changes.
To test the effects of changes in demand functions, we extend the basic model for the on/off-the-run spread by including X AGR t . The extended model is referred to as the AGR model. The model is expressed as
If the on/off-the-run spread is affected by the Fed's injection of liquidity, the coefficient β AGR should be positive because a high demand for liquidity protection should be associated with a high-liquidity premium in the Treasury bond markets.
We report the empirical estimates in Table 5 for the models of the on/offthe-run spread. The t-statistics and p-values in the table are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation as formulated by White (1980) and Newey and West (1987) . The lag in Newey-West adjustment is 10, representing two weeks of business days. We in fact experimented with lags ranging from 0 to 30 and found that the results are qualitatively the same. Both variables X RIV and X AGR have estimation errors. For simplicity, we assume that the measurement errors are not correlated with the errors in our regression specifications. To estimate the specifications, we use data on Treasury note auctions and data on commercial paper rates, which are obtained from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.
Panel A of Table 5 shows the estimates of the basic model based on the daily data during January 4, 1999-January 31, 2000, a period displayed in Figure 9 and discussed in Section 3.1. The basic model provides a partial, but not satisfactory, description of the behavior of the on/off-the-run spread around Y2K. The adjusted R-squared of the basic model is rather small-only 36.63%, showing the low explanatory power of the model. The auction cycle and commercial paper rate (i.e., the coefficients β TLR , β TSQ , β CPB , β CTL , and β CTQ ) are significant. This is consistent with the results reported by Krishnamurthy (2002) . However, none of the coefficients related to the supply of Treasury notes The basic, RIV, and AGR models are estimated using on/off-the-run spreads over the period of January 4, 1999-January 31, 2000. The average spreads on five-year and 10-year Treasury notes are used for the estimates in Panel A, while the spread on five-year notes and the spread on 10-year notes are used separately for the estimates in Panel B. The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
(i.e., β SUP and β STL ) are significant. This is inconsistent with the common intuition that the on/off-the-run spread should be negatively correlated with the supply.
The empirical results show that Y2K options affected the liquidity premium in the Treasury markets. When we include X RIV and X AGR in the model, its explanatory power improves drastically. The adjusted R-squared of the RIV model is 66%, and the adjusted R-squared of the AGR model is 70%. The estimate of coefficient β RIV in the RIV model is positive and significantly different from zero, as shown in Panel A of Table 5 . A high implied volatility of the December 30 strip is associated with a high on/off-the-run spread. The positive coefficient of X RIV implies that the on/off-the-run spread narrowed as the Y2K premium in Y2K options decreased. Since the implied volatility of the December 23 strip stayed almost constant, the decrease in X RIV was related mainly to the fall of the implied volatility of the December 30 strip. Similarly, the estimate of the coefficient β AGR in the AGR model is also positive and significant.
The effects of Y2K options are also evident if we look at the five-year and 10-year Treasury notes separately. As noted earlier, the above results are based on the average on/off-the-run spread of five-year and 10-year notes. We repeat the analysis with the data on five-year notes and 10-year notes separately. The results are qualitatively the same. In Panel B of Table 5 , we report the estimates of the RIV and AGR models. The coefficient of X RIV is 2.01 with a t-statistic of 4.14 when estimated from the data on five-year notes. This coefficient is 8.18 with a t-statistic 9.09 of when estimated from the data on 10-year notes. The coefficient of X AGR is positive and significant regardless of whether five-yearnote data or 10-year-note data are used for estimation.
Robustness of the empirical results
The effects of the Y2K options are robust when we extend the sample period around Y2K. The focus on data in 1999 may cause some concern because the on/off-the-run spread climbed sharply after the Russian default on August 17, 1998. It is well known that the rise of the on/off-the-run spread was one of the major reasons for the collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund in Connecticut. After the collapse of LTCM in the fall of 1998, the on/off-the-run spread started dropping. The drop of the on/off-the-run spread from the crisis of Russian default might have coincided with the drop of on/offthe-run spread in 1999. To address this concern, we extend our data back to August 17, 1998 . This is the earliest date on which our data are available because the five-year and 10-year notes had different auction cycles before this date. 18 To check the robustness of our results, we also extend the data forward to the end of 2000. The results are reported in Table 6 . The coefficients of X RIV and X AGR remain positive and significant. Since liquidity risk and credit risk often rise or fall at the same time, one may be naturally concerned that the implied volatility of the Y2K options may not be correlated with the liquidity component of the on/off-the-run spread but rather the credit risk component. The reason is that the spread may widen when the market perception of the dealers' possibility to default is higher. At the same time, higher credit risk in the dealers market may cause Y2K option premiums to be higher. In this case, it is the credit risk, instead of liquidity, that drives the correlation between the on/off-the-run spread and the price of Y2K options.
In order to address this concern, we need to control for credit risk in our empirical tests. We manually collected the data on the yields of all the straight bonds issued by the primary dealers. To compare with the yields of Treasury The basic, RIV, and AGR models are estimated using on/off-the-run spreads over the extended time periods. The average spreads on five-year and 10-year Treasury notes are used for the estimation. The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The credit spread (CRD) is the difference between the yields of primary dealers bonds and the yield of Treasury bonds with corresponding maturity. The dependent variable in each regression is the on/off-the-run spread. Observations on the credit spread and on/off-the-run spread are daily during January 4, 1999-January 31, 2000. The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
bonds, we require the straight bonds to have maturity of 5, 10, 20, or 30 years.
We found 15 such bonds, for which we calculate, on a daily basis, the average yield spread between these bonds and the Treasury bonds with corresponding maturity. We present the summary statistics of the spreads in Panel A of Table 7 . The mean and median of the spreads during January 4, 1999-January 31, 2000 (271 days) are almost the same: 117 and 116 basis points,
If Y2K options have an effect on liquidity, the coefficients β RIV and β AGR should both be positive.
The empirical estimates of these models, reported in Panel B of Table 7 , show that credit risk is an important factor in the on/off-the-run spread. The second and third columns display the estimates of Equation (14). After being added to the basic model, the credit spread has a positive and significant coefficient, consistent with the intuition that credit risk is a factor in the on/off-the-run spread. The estimates of all other coefficients in Equation (14) are qualitatively similar to those estimates in the basic model (8) reported in Panel A of Table 5 . In Panel B of Table 7 , the fourth and fifth columns contain the estimates of Equation (15). The last two columns present the estimates of Equation (16). As shown in these columns, the coefficient of the credit spread remains positive and significant.
After controlling for credit risk, the coefficients of the variables X RIV and X AGR are still positive and significant in the estimates of Equations (15) and (16). In Table 7 , the coefficient of X RIV is 2.48 (about half of the estimate in Panel A of Table 5 where credit risk is not controlled), and the t-statistic is 3.46. The coefficient of X AGR is 0.38 (about 2/3 of the estimate in Panel A of Table 5 ), and the t-statistic is 4.63. The significant t-statistics demonstrate that the effects of Y2K options are robust after controlling for credit risk.
One might also be concerned that the variables X RIV and X AGR may contain variations in the expectations about the repo volatility and dealer credit risk. The The ratio of the December 30 strip's implied volatility to the January 6 strip's is used to construct RIV * in the same way as RIV. Similarly, the ratio of the December 30 strip's aggressiveness to the January 6 strip's is used to construct AGR * in the same way as AGR. We use RIV * and AGR * to replace RIV and AGR in the regression models (12), (13), (15), and (16) for the on/off-the-run spreads over the period of January 4, 1999-January 31, 2000. The average spreads on five-year and 10-year Treasury notes are used for the estimation. The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
reason for this concern is that these variables are the ratio of the December 30 strip's to the December 23 strip's implied volatility and demand aggressiveness. The December 23 strip options do not contain information about the short period immediately after the century date change. The above concern can be addressed by replacing the December 23 strip with the January 6 strip because the price and demand of the latter strip contain expectations about the post-Y2K week. We can use the ratio of the December 30 strip's implied volatility to the January 6 strip's to construct the variable X RIV * in the same way as X RIV was constructed. Similarly, we can use the ratio of the December 30 strip's aggressiveness to the January 6 strip's to construct X AGR * in the same way as X AGR was constructed. We can then use X RIV * and X AGR * to replace X RIV and X AGR in the regression models (12), (13), (15), and (16) for the on/off-the-run spreads over the period of January 4, 1999-January 31, 2000.
The results of the four regressions using X RIV * and X AGR * are presented in Table 8 . The results remain qualitatively the same as those presented in previous tables. In the first two regressions, the credit spread X CRD is not included as an independent variable, while in other two regressions it is included. Whether the credit spread X CRD is included in the regression or not, both X RIV * and X AGR * are positive and significant.
A Broader View of Central Bank Actions
State-contingent provision of liquidity
The special role played by government debt in providing liquidity to the private sector has been emphasized in a number of papers. Clearly, papers by Diamond (1965) and Woodford (1990) fall into this category. Other papers, such as Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) , stress the role of government bonds in alleviating agency, moral hazard, and informational problems. These models may not be directly applicable to the Y2K event, in which the actions of the Fed were primarily directed to money markets. State-contingent provision of liquidity has been theorized by Holmstrom and Tirole (1996) ; they provide a framework for understanding the optimality of options contracts issued by government. Although their model is stylized and does not exactly correspond to the circumstances of the Y2K problem, the following key insight can be gleaned from their paper: if the potential liquidity shortage is aggregate and the date or period of the shortage is known ahead of time, it is desirable for the central bank to provide state-contingent liquidity. We suspect that this insight is robust with respect to the potential liquidity shock around Y2K. From this viewpoint, Y2K options and their effects on liquidity premium conform to the economic theory.
The Y2K options sold by the Fed constitute a clear example of statecontingent liquidity provision: these options were out of the money by 150 basis points from the Fed funds target rate. The experience during [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] indicates that none of the year-end spikes in repo rates deviated by more than 150 basis points from the Fed funds target rate. In fact, the maximum historical deviation was 146 basis points. Thus, the sale of Y2K options at a strike of 150 basis points above the Fed funds target rate is a classic case of statecontingent provision of liquidity that was targeted to potential spikes in funding costs that go beyond the usual year-end effects in the decade covering 1991-2000. The implied volatilities of these options then allowed us to examine the ex ante beliefs of the dealers about funding costs in the period surrounding Y2K date change.
Other central bank actions prior to Y2K
Besides Y2K options, several other policy initiatives were activated by the US central bank to meet the potential aggregate liquidity shock in the second half of 1999. 19 The central bank extended the maximum maturity of repo operations to 90 days. The purpose of this modification was to meet the year-end seasonal demands and any unusual demands for liquidity, beginning as early as October 1999. In addition, this change in maximum maturity allowed the dealers to fund their inventories through the period of Y2K.
The US central bank also expanded the menu of collateral in repo transactions to include mortgage-backed securities. This change was motivated by the central bank's desire to expand the pool of assets in its balance sheet. The rationale was to ensure that the potential demanders of liquidity from the central bank are able to deliver securities as collateral in the period of crisis. Restricting the pool of assets that are eligible for collateral in repo transactions would have meant that the central bank might have been unable to add its desired level of reserves to some market segments because players in these segments might have been unable to post collateral. This expansion also reduces the incremental demand on government securities that would putatively trade at a significant liquidity premium during periods of liquidity shortage. These government securities will remain in the market, playing a critical role in alleviating the liquidity shortage.
To increase liquidity, the US central bank shifted the normal settlement and custody arrangements for repo transactions to tri-party custodians. The most important aspect of this policy was the fact that the bond dealers and other intermediaries were given greater flexibility to substitute collateral in their repo transactions. This flexibility can be valuable when there is aggregate uncertainty.
One important policy change was that the central bank placed itself as the counterparty. This eliminated counterparty default risk from the perspective of the dealers and banks. In a period of liquidity shortage, default risk is clearly an important consideration for banks and dealers. In the special measures for Y2K, the US central bank was acting as counterparty to the repo transactions, as well as to the options transactions.
Central banks in other countries also took special measures during the Y2K period. For example, the Bank of Canada issued Y2K options that were free of charge to Canadian depository institutions in a manner similar to the SLF provided by the US central bank. 20 Like the US central bank, the Bank of Canada also expanded the range of collateral. As another example, the Bank of England issued special Treasury bills that matured on December 31, 1999. The Bank of England also expanded the maturity date of the repo contract to 90 days and the range of collateral. 21 To our knowledge, however, only the US central bank sold options on liquidity in private markets.
Concluding Remarks
It should be stressed that the effect of Y2K options was mostly in the Treasury bond market, not in broader markets, because Y2K options injected liquidity only into the primary dealers market. The goal of the Fed was to ensure that banks and dealers in the financial markets would not withdraw from the markets around Y2K. The goal was not necessarily to reduce the cost of access to unsecured credit markets by private sector entities. Indeed, during Y2K, we saw an increase in the cost of borrowing for banks because Y2K options did not provide liquidity to the players in unsecured credit markets, such as LIBOR. 
Y2K Options and Liquidity Premium
We have not explored the costs of instituting a program of this nature from the perspective of the central bank, which is the liquidity provider. Drossos and Hilton (2000) briefly touch on the cost-benefit aspect of Y2K options and observe the following: "Moreover, it seemed clear that any potential costs of the Desk's actions fall far short of the costs that could be expected to arise from a breakdown in established financing patterns." A formal analysis of the costs and benefits of state-contingent liquidity provision is worthy of further research.
Our research focus on the liquidity premiums in the Treasury bond markets and Y2K options can be broadened to studies on many related issues. For example, during a liquidity crisis, an important task for the central bank is to reduce the counterparty credit risk. In fact, when the central bank issues Y2K options and expands repo maturity and collateral, it acts as the counterparty to relieve the credit risk. Therefore, it would be interesting to examine margin borrowing, trade credit, and actions by the central bank during a liquidity shock. Such an examination could be a part of future research in this area. In addition, one could explore other foreseeable potential aggregate liquidity events. One such event might be the introduction of Euro currency. Moreover, one could examine year-ends and long holidays for the presence of liquidity premiums and the related actions taken by the central bank.
